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Introduction: 
 
The air transport industry, for all its imperfections and peculiarities, represents perhaps 
the greatest achievement of technology and organization in the twentieth century – an 
achievement which should inspire admiration comparable to that of Dr Samuel Johnson’s 
observation about the dog walking on its hind legs – “Sir, it is not done well; but you are 
surprised to find it done at all.”
1 
 
But commercial air transport is also an intensely paradoxical industry. Cosmopolitan by 
its very nature and daily operations, and dedicated to increasing opportunities for mobility, this 
industry is also one that has been notorious for cloaking itself - or being cloaked - in the mantle 
of nationalism. Air transport was, to no-one’s surprise, the one topic that participants in the 
original negotiations about the General Agreement on Trade in Services unanimously agreed to 
exclude from their agenda.
2  The nationalism and protectionism endemic in this industry are, 
indeed, a serious brake on the globalization that observers have discerned in recent enterprise 
alliances such as Star and Oneworld.  
 
Two examples will illustrate the archaic and cramping character of the regulatory regime 
currently governing the industry – the so-called “Chicago regime”.  One is offered by the 
standard language of international bilateral agreements on aviation (taken in this case from the 
recent U.S.-France bilateral agreement of June 1998).  Article 1 of this agreement prescribes that 
the names of airlines authorized by their respective governments to fly between the two countries 
shall be “transmitted… in writing through diplomatic channels.”
3  Thus, in order to fly 
passengers between Paris and New York, Air France (a firm that in 1998 carried 33,169,000 
passengers and had an operating revenue of  $9,694,981,000) and United Airlines (the leader of 
an alliance that in 1998 carried 233,936,000 passengers worldwide and had an aggregate 
operating revenue of  $52,948,100,000) have first to be formally designated by “their” 
governments as authorized to engage in trade.
4  Imagine the reaction if similar requirements were 
imposed on, say, United Colors of Benetton or McDonalds.   
                                                 
1 A first version of this paper was given at a conference on “Creating a Transatlantic Marketplace: 
Government Policies and Business Strategies,” organized by Dr. Michelle Egan and Dr. Dieter Wolf for 
the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington, 
D.C., on 4-5 November 1999. 
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A second example is the odd situation that arose in August 1999, when British Airways  
(BA) announced that it would cease its nonstop service between Pittsburgh and London. BA had 
operated this service exclusively since 1985 under authority provided by the 1977 “Bermuda II” 
bilateral agreement between the UK and the US.  BA took this decision on purely commercial 
grounds (because of its new strategy of concentrating on high-yield business traffic (discussed 
below)): it had reportedly said that it would not oppose adoption of the route by USAirways 
which (with control of 86.1% of flights at Pittsburgh International Airport) was well placed to 
run the route profitably and was anxious to add a London service to its existing daily 
international services (to Frankfurt and Paris) fed by a 72-point hub-and-spoke system centered 
at Pittsburgh.   
 
Despite evidence that the route was viable, the British government transferred the route 
authority from BA to Virgin Atlantic, to enable the latter to fly vacation travelers between 
London and Las Vegas.
5   The British government was acting entirely legally in transferring the 
authority and Virgin Atlantic was, in effect, at the head of the waiting list for new authorities, 
having lost to BA in a recent contest for transatlantic service.
6 But this decision prevented 
USAirways from taking over the Pittsburgh-London route and led to great resentment in western 
Pennsylvania, culminating in the holding of a Congressional hearing (beside the international 
gates at Pittsburgh International Airport). 
 
This episode (which was described by a US DOT official as “a poster child for the evils 
of Bermuda II”) revealed the potential under the current regulatory regime for denial of 
international service by national governments to cities abroad.
7  Absent surrender of an existing 
authority by USAirways or another US carrier under the US allotment of such authorities or 
some kind of special deal, airlines were subsequently prohibited from flying between Pittsburgh 
and London.  The regulatory regime in international aviation is probably unique in that, while 
other regulatory regimes may restrict or channel demand, this one can actually suppress it. 
 
  Optimists believe that procedures and decisions of the kind illustrated above are doomed 
by an irresistible tide of liberalization.  They point to the sheer size of  (in this case) the EU-US 
market and to the proliferation of  “open skies” agreements to suggest that aviation is about to 
burst out of its regulatory chrysalis to emerge as an exceptionally beautiful free-trading butterfly.  
This chapter will examine the character and present structure of this industry and will then 
explore the actual prospects and routes for liberalization of transatlantic air transport. The 
discussion is divided into the following sections: 
 
Transatlantic air transport: 
 
·  Air transport as an industry; 
·  The transatlantic market; 
·  The regulatory regime; 
·  The regulatory regime and airline strategies; 
·  Airline strategies I: market share or shareholder value? 
·  Airline strategies II: enterprise alliances 
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Routes to liberalization: 
 
·  Route I:   “Open skies” agreements? 
·  Route II:  A transatlantic common aviation area? 
·  Route III: The General Agreement on Trade in Services? 
·  Route IV: Multilaterals or plurilaterals? 
 
Conclusions 
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TRANSATLANTIC AIR TRANSPORT: 
 
AIR TRANSPORT AS A SERVICE INDUSTRY:  
 
  The airline industry, in common with many service industries, likes to talk about its 
“products”. Such language suggests a suspicion that customers might be reassured by the notion 
of something solidly manufacture-like - something that, as The Economist has put it, you can 
drop on your foot - rather than the still rather unnerving business of flying seats through the air 
and selling paperless tickets in which it is actually engaged.  But it does itself a disservice by 
using this language, opening itself up to ridicule of its marketing practices (as in the paint shop 
story, reproduced in Appendix 1). 
 
For, in truth, the airline industry does not sell “products” in anything like the traditional 
sense. It is a service industry, in the sense that when you buy a seat on a plane, you are not 
normally allowed to take the seat with you when the plane lands.  Marketing of air transport is, 
consequently, different in crucial respects from selling pots of paint, though both industries do 
have differentiated “products”, with differentiated prices, as well as limited-time sales.  
 
The airline industry is surely better described as one selling something much more 
perishable, like bananas – produce, in fact, rather than.a product.
8 Such produce has, in a sense, 
to be consumed before it can be unpeeled. Once the aircraft succeeds in leaving the ground, any 
unconsumed produce - empty seats - immediately and irretrievably goes rotten. The same 
dilemma does face other service industries such as theatre and hotel managements. But the 
special problem of the airline industry is the very large capital investment that it has to make in 
order to persuade its rather fickle customers to consume.  Few hotels, theaters or fruit stalls cost 
the $144 million that is the current price of a new Boeing 747-400.
9  
 
So, if we had to make a comparison with paint shops, we would have to say that air 
transport is an industry in which the cans are incredibly expensive, the paint has no shelf-life 
worth measuring, and inventory doesn’t exist. (Also, very few people die as the result of a can of 
paint leaking or bursting)  With such high costs, high risks and dire economics, it is not 
surprising that this is an industry that has been both highly protected and closely regulated. 
Without the first, it might not have survived; without the second, many of its customers might 
not have survived. 
 
To make matters worse, air transport is an industry in which, while fixed investments are 
very substantial and costly, demand is quite unpredictable and is subject to dramatic reduction 
because of events beyond its control (such as an economic downturn or a war). It has to purchase 
(or lease) extremely expensive equipment and hire highly skilled and expensive labor without 
any adequate assurance of reasonable or sustained returns. Moreover, it does not sell flight by the 
single seat-unit (as a paint store might buy one or two cans of paint).  
 
Though airlines have made great efforts to acquire varied fleets and, by techniques of  
“yield management”, to adjust the supply of seats to predicted demand on specific routes and at 
specific times on specific days, the challenge of “putting bums in seats” (as Eddie Rickenbacker,   5 
the veteran aviator and CEO of Eastern Airlines defined the air transport business) is exacting 
and few planes (whatever the crammed passengers may think) ever fly completely full.   
 
Air transport is thus different, at least in degree, from other service industries because of  
the exceptional perishability of its “product” and the exceptionally high costs of offering it. It is 
also different because of the industry’s long history of protection (originally stimulated by 
concerns about national security) and because of an equally long history in which a heady 
mixture of romanticism and desire for national prestige has created chronic oversupply and 
equally chronic deficits. 
 
THE TRANSATLANTIC MARKET: 
 
The North Atlantic market possesses all of the general characteristics of the airline 
industry and, indeed, is the supreme example of the problems and strategies encountered in 
international aviation. Historically, it is actually a more recently developed international market, 
compared to both the routes between Europe and Asia and Africa, which developed before 
World War II as a matter of imperial strategy, and those within the western hemisphere 
developed by Pan American and other US carriers. True commercial service to the United States 
only began after World War 2: even as late as 1949, fewer than 300,000 passengers a year were 
crossing by air and it was only in 1957 that the number flying the Atlantic by air exceeded those 
travelling by sea.
10  
 
The introduction of jet airliners (and eventually large widebodies such as the 747) 
increased reliability and productivity further, leading in turn to lower fares yet more 
passengers.
11 In 1980, over 16 million passengers flew across the North Atlantic: by 1990, this 
figure had jumped again to 30, 430,000, with a forecast of 51, 800,000 by 2001 - a fiftyfold 
increase in passenger traffic since 1957.
12 Passengers carried on transatlantic flights now 
represent approximately fourteen per cent of all passengers carried by air worldwide, partly 
because transatlantic flights connect the world’s two largest domestic air  
transport markets – the European and the U.S. markets (with 28.4% and 41.35%, respectively, of  
the world’s air traffic).
13 
 
Revenue from transatlantic routes is substantial - in 1998, $20 billion from services 
between the EU and the US (with $10 billion of the total coming just from routes between the 
UK and the US).
14  The revenue  - and the profits - of several EU airlines depend substantially on 
transatlantic routes: in 1992, for example, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines obtained 33.9 per cent of 
all its revenue from transatlantic services, followed by BA with 30.7 per cent and Swissair with 
24.9 per cent (see Table 1).
15  Figures for profits for particular markets and routes are hard to 
obtain, but it has been reported that Lufthansa in the early nineties was deriving some thirty per 
cent of its profits from transatlantic services.
16   6 
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TABLE 1: Derivation of revenues from markets, 1992 
 
CARRIER 
 
EUROPEAN 
MARKET  
(%) 
 
EXTRA-EUROPEAN 
MARKET  
(%) 
 
 
EXTRA-
EUROPEAN, 
ATLANTIC  
(%) 
KLM 
 
28.9 
 
65.3 
 
(33) 
 
BRITISH AIRWAYS 
 
42.2 
 
57.8 
 
(30.7) 
 
SWISSAIR 
 
47.6 
 
52.4 
 
(24.9) 
 
AIR FRANCE 
 
50.1 
 
49.9 
 
(16.7) 
 
EU AVERAGE 
 
50.7 
 
49.3 
 
(18.4) 
 
LUFTHANSA 
 
52.8 
 
47.2 
 
(20.6) 
 
ALITALIA 
 
55.6 
 
44.4 
 
(16.6) 
 
IBERIA 
 
70.1 
 
29.9 
 
(25.6) 
 
SAS 
 
80.9 
 
19.1 
 
(10.2) 
 
Source: Lehmann Brothers, European Airlines: A Turbulent Decade, 14 September 1993, n.p. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  Despite its spectacular growth, the North Atlantic market has been chronically afflicted 
by what has been described as “profitless growth syndrome”.
17   Ironically, in 1976, when ocean 
liners were left with only five percent of the passengers they had carried twenty years earlier, a 
book was published about the capacity and pricing problems of the North Atlantic air transport 
market subtitled Saving an Endangered System and describing this market as in a “sick 
condition” with losses “chronic and widespread.”
18  Though airline alliances have recently 
offered a way of controlling capacity, the problem of overcapacity and the profit-destroying fare 
wars they engender have continued to afflict air services across the North Atlantic, as well as 
other popular, high-volume sectors of the industry.  
 
The problem of overcapacity is common to both EU and US airlines. But in order to 
understand American policy and European responses, it is important to remember that the 
division of traffic on transatlantic routes underwent a dramatic change during the nineteen-
eighties. Before 1978 (and deregulation in the US), the share of transatlantic traffic carried by the 
two main American international carriers (Pan Am and TWA) declined continually, partly 
because of the revival and re-establishment of European airlines after the war and partly because, 
with decolonization, the flag carriers of European imperial powers began to concentrate on 
transatlantic routes to compensate for the routes and traffic lost with the collapse of their 
empires.
19    
 
But this trend was reversed after deregulation in the US led (ironically) to the 
reconsolidation of the American industry and aggressive international expansion by US majors   7 
(notably “the Big Three” – American, Delta and United) which had previously been inactive on 
international routes.  By 1993, the European airlines’ share of the market had shrunk from 68% 
(in 1962) to 48% and European airlines were clamoring for protection against  “the American 
invasion”(an invasion that was possible because many bilaterals (negotiated in the post-war 
years) were generous in allowing  “unrestricted capacity increase and the ability to open new 
routes almost at will”).
20   
 
By offering low fares and frequent service, US airlines were able to capture some 61% of 
traffic between the US and Germany and 71% of traffic between the US and France 
(respectively, the second and third largest transatlantic markets).
21  Both France and Germany 
demanded renegotiation of their bilaterals with the US (and France actually renounced its 
bilateral in 1992, transatlantic services continuing on the basis of annual agreements). Both 
countries felt obliged to resist pressure for liberalization until Air France and Lufthansa had 
undergone drastic restructuring preparatory to privatization and were better able to compete with 
the “Big Three”, especially given the simultaneous pressures created by liberalization of air 
services within the European single market.  
 
THE REGULATORY REGIME: 
 
Regulation of air travel between Europe and the US still rests on the foundation provided 
by the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and the 3000-plus bilateral Air 
Service Agreements (ASAs) concluded within the framework of this Convention.  The 
agreements (such as “Bermuda II”) stipulate what routes may be flown between airports on the 
territories of the signatories and with what frequency: they may also contain limits on capacity 
and provisions for authorizing fares. Perhaps even more importantly, the Convention and the 
arguments and laws derived from it contain strict provisions about nationality, stipulating that in 
order to use the rights assigned to a country, the designated airlines must be “substantially owned 
and effectively controlled” by nationals of the countries concerned. These nationality provisions 
stand directly in the path of any international liberalization and, indeed, any consolidation of the 
airline industry.  
 
For many years, bilateral ASAs provided for comfortable duopolies exercised by the 
respective state airlines of contracting states, even allowing for a pooling of revenues on shared 
routes (a practice that, interestingly, the more integrated of the current airline alliances intend to 
revive).  For many years, too, (indeed, at the Chicago Convention itself), the US has been 
seeking to liberalize bilateral agreements, arguing that liberalization will lead, via greater 
competition, to lower fares and a dramatic expansion of traffic. Both consumers and airlines will 
thus benefit (though, as critics point out, not all the airlines will necessarily survive to reap the 
benefits). Since 1978, the US has consciously and aggressively tried to apply to international 
markets the principles of deregulation applied in that year to the US domestic market.  The 
outcome has been a series of so-called “open skies” agreements which permit, without 
restriction, airlines registered in the countries concerned to fly between any points in their own 
countries and in the other countries.   
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THE REGULATORY REGIME AND AIRLINE STRATEGIES: 
 
An airline’s strategy is shaped by regulatory conditions as well as by “pure” demand and 
supply. Regulation not only determines costs (as, for example, by requiring certain levels of 
maintenance and training and imposing certain qualities and quantities of equipment), but it can 
actually determine supply (and usually has done so in this industry). [It can even - as in the 
Pittsburgh case - suppress demand]  British Airways, for example, has traditionally drawn high 
profits from its services to Africa and the Middle East (routes which are still subject to very strict 
regulation through bilateral agreements under the Chicago convention. Conversely, BA draws 
very low profits from its intra-European services and almost none from its services in the UK 
(where it faces direct competition from rail and road transportation). 
 
The regulatory dimension is bound to be a complicating factor in how airlines regard 
liberalization and in their choice of strategy.  In a highly regulated market (such as all the routes 
serving London Heathrow), any authorized airline can derive a “rent” (in the strict economic 
sense) from lack of competition.
22  An airline in this situation may prefer to emphasize profit 
over market share (which – as discussed below – seems now to be the case with BA): it may 
even prefer the profits to be gleaned in a regulated market to the potentially greater revenue (and 
the smaller profits) to be earned in a liberalized market.   
 
AIRLINE STRATEGIES I: MARKET SHARE OR SHAREHOLDER VALUE? 
 
The transatlantic market has for many years been plagued, even more than other markets, 
by overcapacity. Airlines have responded to high and rising personal incomes in both the EU and 
the US by providing more seats, especially for leisure travellers.  But, with so many airlines 
operating across the Atlantic and competing for market share, overcapacity can easily occur. 
 
  Faced with high losses from overcapacity, airlines have several choices. All carriers will 
try to reduce risk, by fitting capacity very closely to expected demand (sometimes by 
overbooking).  At the same time, airlines will eliminate any costs that can be eliminated (such as 
unprofitable routes) and will reduce every conceivable cost unavoidably associated with flight. 
They will also try to attract revenue by adjusting price to the costs of offering different 
conditions for flying.
23 
 
  If overcapacity becomes a serious problem, airlines may appeal to governments to 
impose or enforce regulatory controls on capacity (as both Air France and Sabena tried to do 
during the crisis following the Gulf War).
24 But such an appeal is only effective where airlines 
are state-owned, and even before the current wave of privatization, capacity controls were 
sometimes absent or weak. Without regulatory controls on capacity, airlines face more painful 
choices. They may simply withdraw from particular, inadequately profitable routes (as in the 
case of BA and the Pittsburgh-London route). But, at least in liberalized markets, they surrender 
traffic and goodwill by doing so.  In addition (or instead), they may take the “traditional” route 
of engaging in periodic fare wars so as to increase market share, while at the same time trying to 
reduce costs (as, notably, Continental and Air France were doing in the summer and fall of 1999 
(see Table 2 below).  A less traditional and more radical route is deliberately to reduce capacity   9 
and to concentrate on increasing revenue (and thereby please shareholders and  prospective 
investors).  
 
  The choice of strategies became particularly acute and transparent in the course of 1999, 
when dramatic increases in capacity occurred on North Atlantic routes. By August 1999, the 
number of seats offered on North Atlantic routes was between ten and eleven per higher than in 
the corresponding month of 1998, while demand, though strong, was only growing at between 
four and five per cent.
25  As Table 2 indicates, in September 1999 at least two major carriers 
were offering over twenty per cent more seats on North Atlantic routes than in September 1998. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE 2: THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM:  TRANSATLANTIC SERVICES, FALL 1999* 
AIRLINE  NUMBER OF 
FLIGHTS PER 
WEEK 
SEATS OFFERED 
WEEKLY 
WEEKLY 
CAPACITY 
(Available seat- 
kilometers) 
BRITISH AIRWAYS              +     6  -   1.0%  -0.7% 
UNITED               +   28  +10.0%  +9.8% 
DELTA               +   23  +  6.0%  +4.7% 
AMERICAN               +     0               +  7.0%  +9.2% 
LUFTHANSA              +   26  + 17.0%  +15.7% 
CONTINENTAL               +   56  + 24.0%  +22.8% 
VIRGIN ATLANTIC              +   32  + 17.0%  +15.2% 
AIR FRANCE              +   30               +   8.0%  +8.4.% 
KLM               +     4  -   1.0%  -0.8% 
SWISSAIR              +   44              +  25.0%  +25.4% 
TOTAL:              + 388              +    8.7%  +8.8% 
 
* - planned capacity, September 1999 compared to September 1998. 
 
Source: “Mind the capacity gap,” Airline Business, November 1999, 85. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------ 
 
While a gap between capacity and demand has been endemic in this market, the 1999 glut was 
brought about by a special factor – the transfer of aircraft from services to and from Asia where the 
serious economic crisis had caused a severe decline in air traffic. Most airlines responded in the usual 
way, by seeking market share through a fare war that, while appealing to the public, pushed revenue 
down to a point where the costs of offering service were barely covered by revenue.  
 
The 1999 crisis was, however, especially significant because the consequent drop in revenues 
and profits was bad enough to cause one carrier – BA – to opt out of the usual race to the bottom, with 
its inevitable consequences for profits.
26  Arguing that it made no sense to sell seats at less than the cost 
of  providing them, BA took the radical (and, in some eyes, dangerous) course of  reducing capacity by 
using smaller aircraft, eliminating less profitable routes (including connecting domestic and European 
services) and (above all) concentrating on attracting high-yield business passengers.
27   This strategy 
was generally acknowledged to be bold and courageous in “an industry long characterized by an 
institutional inability to reject any marginal business.”
28  It was also very risky in that it could alienate   10 
loyal, non-business passengers without attracting a sufficiently large proportion of the (much-coveted) 
business customers to compensate for the loss of revenue at the back of the plane (where fewer seats for 
economy travelers would be available).  Statements by BA spokesmen did not always seem to 
recognize the fine line between attracting one without insulting the other
29. BA acquired the image of a 
carrier that (in the words of the highly respected aerospace correspondent of The Financial Times) was 
trying to become “an airline for the wealthy” – an assertion that its Director of Communications was at 
pains to dispel.
30 
 
The inarticulate premise of BA’s strategy may be (as suggested above) the continuation of a 
dominant position protected, outside of Europe, by a web of  quite restrictive bilateral agreements 
(including the Bermuda II agreement).  Such protectionism puts it in a stronger position to pick and 
choose customers - a luxury not available to its competitors operating under “open skies” agreements. 
 
AIRLINE STRATEGIES II: ENTERPRISE ALLIANCES: 
 
The rationale for the initial alliances between specific EU and US carriers is quite clear. By 
1992, essentially the same dilemma faced both the major EU and major US carriers. Both had very 
large stakes in North Atlantic routes (and both had been hurt badly by the slump in traffic caused by the 
Gulf War). Both groups were anxious to draw more directly on traffic within the other’s home markets 
(that is, the Americans from the EU market and the Europeans from the US market).  
 
Of the two, the Europeans were perhaps the more anxious. They saw an American market 
which (in terms of traffic rather than population) was larger even than that becoming available 
through the emerging European single market. Further, and critically, they saw an American 
market that was becoming increasingly rationalized into hub-and-spoke route systems, with the 
hubs often located well away from the traditional east and west coast ports of entry for 
international traffic. International airlines – American and European – had quite automatically 
followed the logic of sea travel (and of population distribution as it was in the forties and fifties) 
and concentrated on east and west coast cities. At this time, Chicago would have been an 
obvious, additional inland port of entry. But no-one would have dreamed that Atlanta would 
become the world’s busiest airport, that Chicago, Dallas, Denver and Miami would all eventually 
be busier than New York, Boston, Philadelphia and Washington - or that Charlotte, NC, might 
eventually rank right under Singapore.
31    
 
The new US hubs provided great concentrations of traffic that would support 
international services by those – the US majors – who could schedule feeder services so as to 
provide fast connections.  The predicament of EU airlines was that, even if they could obtain 
international authority to fly to the hubs concerned, they could not under US law organize their 
own hub-and-spoke systems within the US.  The next best solution was to form alliances with 
the carriers who did control these hubs and arrange connecting flights that would appear in 
computer reservation systems as direct flights by a single carrier (even if in reality the flights 
were operated by two carriers).  This practice – known as “codesharing” – produced, as if by 
magic, thousands of apparent direct services between points all over the US and points all over 
Europe.  Flights may bear two or even three airline designator codes and indeed the price of an 
identical seat on the same flight may vary substantially from one airline to another.    11 
 
Access to a European network represented the reciprocal advantage for American carriers 
in alliances with EU airlines. Just as European carriers cannot fly between Washington Dulles 
and Lynchburg, Va., so American carriers cannot fly between London Heathrow and the Isle of 
Man.  Under EU law, only “Community carriers” may fly on routes within the European Union, 
and to qualify as a “Community carrier” an airline must (in language only too familiar from the 
wording of the Chicago convention) have “its principal place of business and…registered office” 
within a Member State and must be: 
 
owned and continue to be owned directly or through a majority ownership by Member 
States and/or nationals of Member States. It shall at all times be effectively controlled by 
such states or such nationals.
32 
 
In the EU’s case, “effective control” is interpreted to mean that at least 51% of voting stock is in 
the hands of EU nationals.
33  (The EU’s rule is in fact more liberal from the point of view of 
foreign investors than that currently in US law (which requires 75% national ownership).)  
 
The European Commission has proposed to the US that, as an element in creating a 
“common EU-US aviation area”(discussed below), both parties should accept a 49% limit on 
foreign ownership of voting equity, “while ensuring that majority ownership and effective 
control remain in the hands of member States and/or their nationals and in the hands of US 
nationals for US carriers.”
 34  But even with such a relative liberalization, the rules governing 
foreign ownership of airlines - in both EU and US jurisdictions - remain more restrictive than 
those applying to investment in other industries.   
 
To fall into line with the latter, the ownership requirement would have to be replaced by 
one simply requiring establishment.  Indeed, Article 58 of the EC treaty gives the right of 
establishment to “companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and 
having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the 
Community”. Application of this principle (accompanied by a parallel substitution of the 
criterion of local incorporation for substantive ownership in countries outside the EU) would, of 
course, open the gate to full foreign direct investment in the airline industry. 
                        
  While opposition to lifting such restrictions on foreign investment and establishment 
certainly comes from some active and identifiable sources, the immediate obstacle is the 
nationality principle vested in the Chicago convention and accepted by all states (including, of 
course, the US).  While some enterprise alliances do involve equity purchases, the latter are 
typically small on both sides of the Atlantic.  Both BA and KLM have run up against US 
restrictions in their separate alliances with US carriers.
35   
 
  On the European side, the existence of the common market means that there are no 
restrictions on complete takeover of or mergers between airlines operating exclusively within the 
territory of the Union. However, a takeover of an airline with routes outside the Union (whether 
by a company based in another Member State or by one based outside the EU), while it would 
break no laws, could well be commercially self-defeating.  Suppose, for example, that American 
Airlines and BA were allowed to buy a 51% share in Iberia, instead of the total of ten percent 
currently approved by the Spanish government. In this situation, Iberia would be not only   12 
privatized but – in a special sense – “denationalized”. It would cease to be an airline 
“substantially owned and effectively controlled” by Spanish nationals.  The Spanish government 
would then be obliged, under its various bilaterals, to withdraw its authority to fly on routes 
outside the EU. The relevant foreign governments (probably on the urging of their own airlines) 
would either withdraw its landing authority or (if the Spanish government insisted on allowing it 
to operate) would probably renounce the bilateral agreement in force.
36  Thus Iberia’s new owner 
might find that all its investment had bought it (apart from a fleet usable on intra-EU routes) was 
an impressive but costly static display of intercontinental airliners, and a correspondingly 
impressive payroll.
37 
 
“Enterprise alliances” are thus second-best solutions to the forbidden (but more normal) 
commercial and investment options of direct establishment in a market (American-BA would 
operate its own flights within as well as to and from Spain) and equity purchase (American-BA 
would simply buy Iberia and take over all its routes).  As the chairman of KLM has put it: 
"Alliances are...a reasoned response to an antiquated regulatory system....[They] permit indirect 
access to restricted markets."
38  Alliances enable airlines to make the best of a situation in which 
they are forced to operate under a divided regulatory regime  - one (deregulated or liberalized) 
governing the domestic US and EU markets, the other (only partially liberalized) governing 
flights between cities in these two markets. 
 
At the European level, what we now see emerging is a regional system that is structurally 
quite different from its North American counterpart. The European structure (and the larger 
global structure now taking form) is one dominated by multi-tiered alliances rather than by a 
consolidation into four or five “mega-airlines” such as emerged in the US in the mid-eighties. 
Nationality rules (and the preferences of governments) stand in the way of such a consolidation. 
Instead, we can discern an almost-feudal hierarchy of major and minor European carriers, linked 
to larger alliance systems. This hierarchy, in fact, resembles (and is linked to) corresponding 
hierarchies within the US and (increasingly) elsewhere.  Through a range of devices, the larger 
carriers have both created alliances among themselves and have attached the smaller carriers to 
themselves as “clients” feeding traffic into a set of international hubs.
39 Such a hierarchy is 
intentionally exclusive in character. It is intended to exclude upstarts such as easyJet and Virgin 
Express from competing on regional routes (in this case, those within Europe), and to exclude 
rival alliances from central hubs by starving them of feeder traffic for their international services.  
 
  Supposing for the moment that this characterization is roughly accurate, we need to 
consider two questions: first, how strong and permanent is this structure likely to prove; and, 
secondly, what are the implications of such a structure for the goals that are sought through 
liberalization? 
 
As to durability, we are now going through a phase of what one observer describes as 
“alliance churning.”
40  On a global scale, the warfare between the alliances goes on 
spasmodically and in phases concentrated in different regions (rather like a commercial version 
of the Thirty Years War).  In recent weeks, a major and intense pitched battle has been occurring 
on the plains of Canada, as the champions of Oneworld  (the BA-American league) struggle for 
control of Air Canada with their sworn foes in the Star Alliance (the league led by Lufthansa and 
United).  Intense tactical action and realignment is also occurring at present on the European   13 
field: Delta has just separated from Swissair and its European associates in the “Qualiflyer” 
alliance, Austrian Airlines has also left “Qualiflyer” to join the Star Alliance, and Lufthansa has 
made a major investment in British Midland (which owns over twenty per cent of slots at 
London Heathrow).   
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Table 3: AIRLINE ALLIANCES (major partners, 12/05/99; passengers, 1998) 
Alliance 
Star Alliance 
Members 
(Passengers, 
1998) 
Oneworld 
Members 
(Passengers, 
1998) 
Qualiflyer 
Members 
(Passengers, 
1998) 
Wings 
Members 
(Passengers, 
1998) 
Delta 
Members 
(Passengers, 
1998) 
Europe 
LUFTHANSA 
(36,059,000) 
 
S.A.S. 
(21,688,000) 
 
AUSTRIAN 
(1,576,000) 
 
BRITISH 
MIDLAND 
(905,000) 
BRITISH 
AIRWAYS 
(31,325,000) 
 
IBERIA 
(21,753,000) 
 
FINNAIR 
(7,385,000) 
 
AER LINGUS 
(5,506,000) 
SWISSAIR 
(12,891,000) 
 
SABENA 
(8,749,000) 
 
TAP AIR 
PORTUGAL 
(4,538,000) 
 
THY TURKISH 
(10,504,000) 
KLM 
(15,077,000) 
 
ALITALIA 
(24,103,000) 
 
BRAATHENS 
S.A.F.E. 
(6,973,000) 
AIR FRANCE 
(33,169,000) 
North 
America 
UNITED 
(86,867,000) 
 
AIR CANADA 
(14,800,000) 
AMERICAN 
(81,477,000) 
 
CANADIAN 
(8,344,000) 
? 
NORTHWEST 
(50,500,000) 
 
CONTINENTAL 
(43,625,000) 
DELTA 
(105,390,000) 
Central & 
South 
America 
VARIG 
(11,019,000) 
LANCHILE 
(2,998,000)     AEROMEXICO 
(7,816,000) 
Asia 
THAI 
(15,613,000) 
 
SINGAPORE 
(12,329,000) 
 
ALL NIPPON 
(41,491,000) 
CATHAY 
PACIFIC 
(10,299,000) 
 
J.A.L. 
(31,363,000) 
 
MALAYSIA 
A.S.  
(12,521,000) 
 
Pacific 
ANSETT 
(6,150,000) 
 
AIR NEW 
ZEALAND 
(6,399,000) 
QANTAS 
(18,865,000)     
Passengers 
(total, 1998) 
254,896,000 366,761,000  36,682,000  152,799,000  146,375,000 
 
Sources: “World Airline Report,” Air Transport World, July 1999, 50-143; “News Briefs,” Air Transport 
World, November 1999, 9; “Headline News,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 25 October 1999, 
28-9. 
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In the short term, all this activity simply means that the various alliances are scrambling 
to sign up the ever-smaller pool of unaffiliated (and attractive) airlines, while some of the 
second-rank airlines are re-examining their original choices before they become locked in to 
long-term relationships from which they might find it difficult to extricate themselves.  How 
“long-term” any of these relationships will be is anyone’s guess. After much early talk about 
“global mega-carriers”, the mood among observers of the airline industry seems to have swung 
in a more sceptical direction. The airline industry is certainly as subject to fads in strategic 
management as any other and it is possible that experience will show that the disadvantages of 
coordination generally outweigh the advantages. 
 
Regulatory action of two kinds would certainly alter the pros and cons of alliance-
building.  Sustained, publicly-supported opposition to alliances from competition authorities, 
notably DG Competition in Brussels and the US Department of Justice, on grounds that the 
alliances are anti-competitive would probably cause at least some reduction in the ambitions of 
alliance-leaders. The DOJ’s rejection of the AA-BA alliance and the lengthy scrutiny of this 
alliance in Brussels are unambiguous signals of growing doubts about the probable benefits for 
consumers from alliances. (Ironically, airline managers (including some alliance leaders) may, 
unintentionally, have fed such doubts by attacking the BA-AA arrangement and others as 
“monopolistic” and “anti-competitive” – a charge that may have woken some dogs that might 
otherwise have slept on).
41  
 
Rather belatedly, the European Commission has launched investigations of the alliances 
preceding AA-BA (all the way back to the original KLM-Northwest wedding of 1988). Members 
of the European Parliament and other legislatures, as well as officials of competition bodies, are 
all too aware of the oligopolistic outcome of deregulation in the US and have also had long and 
recent experience of their own local oligopoly – the state airlines so frequently abused and so 
recently privatized.  Denial or withdrawal of anti-trust immunity – which is crucial to the 
integration of alliances and to the economies to be gained through them - might be enough to 
cause some strategic rethinking (not to mention some defection).
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The other type of regulatory change that might put an end to the alliance system (for 
better or worse) would be substantial relaxation and even abandonment of the Chicago regime 
and its apparatus of nationality-constrained bilaterals. If the bilateral system and national rules 
limiting foreign equity purchase were to disappear or be relaxed to allow a right of establishment 
by foreign airlines in domestic market, the alliance system might well crumble quickly. As the 
veteran airline analyst Julius Maldutis has commented about alliances: 
 
Some 25 years ago, we used to call them interline agreements. The only difference is  
      that today you fool the passenger into thinking he’s flying on one single airline. But             
      alliances…are nothing more than substitutes for mergers.
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The remainder of the paper examines ways in which the international air transport industry might 
break out of the corset within which the Chicago system currently requires it to live.   15 
ROUTES TO LIBERALIZATION: 
 
ROUTE I:  “OPEN SKIES” AGREEMENTS 
 
Conclusion of  bilateral “open skies” agreements has been the consistent objective of US 
international aviation policy since 1978.  Under the Carter, Bush and Clinton administrations, 
this objective met resistance from the larger EU Member States (notably France, the UK and 
(until 1996) Germany.  In response, American negotiators deliberately adopted the tactic of 
seeking agreements with the smaller Member States, in the hope that  expanded service and 
lower fares from the latter would  draw passengers away from the more obdurate states, forcing 
them to reconsider their  opposition to “open skies”.  
 
Progress in this campaign has been uneven. Though the US was highly successful in 
concluding “open skies” agreements with the smaller Member States (starting with the 
Netherlands in 1992), it only obtained an open skies agreement with Germany (the second 
largest transatlantic market) in 1996, while the agreement for gradual liberalization signed with 
France in 1998 is not described by either party as an “open skies” agreement. The UK  
(which offers the largest transatlantic market, with roughly 34% of all traffic) has resisted any 
substantial liberalization, especially liberalization of access to London Heathrow, into which 
only two US airlines are allowed to fly. Moreover, the American campaign has provoked a 
counter-campaign by the European Commission, at least one object of which has been to 
frustrate the avowedly “divide-and-rule” strategy of Washington.
44 
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FIGURE 1. Global Alliance Volume, 1998. 
 
Source: Salomon Smith Barney, Report to the Minister for Public Enterprise and the Minister for Finance 
[Republic of Ireland]. Advice and Assistance in Relation to a Strategic Alliance for Aer Lingus, July 
1999, 8. 
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Global Alliance Volume 1998 (Revenue 
Passenger Kilometers)
Qualifyer
(10.3%)
Delta/Air France
(9.2%)
Wings (10.5%)
oneworld
(17.4%)
STAR (18%)
Unaligned
(34.6%)  16 
Though the US has succeeded globally in securing fewer than forty “open skies 
agreements”, its claims about the benefits of liberalization have been borne out by experience in 
the liberalized markets. A study published in 1995 suggested that liberalization in the late 
eighties (before the current wave of open skies agreements) had decreased fares on North 
Atlantic services by between 35% and 45% and had increased boardings on these services at US 
airports by as much as 55%.
45  The same study concluded that transatlantic liberalization had 
resulted in consumer gains of  $5.1 billion in 1989 alone – the equivalent of $585 per consumer.  
 
  The effects of the post-1992 agreements have been equally dramatic. According to a 
Department of Transportation official, fares on all services governed by open skies agreements 
with European countries have dropped by seventeen per cent since 1996.
46. The Dutch agreement 
led to a substantial increase in North Atlantic traffic through Amsterdam (a large proportion of 
the increase being traffic drawn from airports in neighboring countries that were under still more 
restrictive bilaterals – exactly the kind of diversion of trade that US negotiators had hoped would 
occur).
47 By 1995, Schiphol airport in Amsterdam had overtaken Charles de Gaulle airport in 
Paris as the fourth largest European “gateway”, the number of transatlantic passengers flying 
through Amsterdam having grown by 74% between 1989 and 1994.
48.  In the case of Germany, 
fares (which had risen by fifty per cent between 1993 and 1996) dropped by ten per cent in the 
two years following signature of an open skies agreement with the US in 1996.
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But the open skies formula suffers from at least four serious limitations as a route to 
broader liberalization of air transport.  Three of these limitations derive from the premises and 
principles of the Chicago convention, while the fourth stems from the response of the European 
Commission. 
 
First, “open skies” agreements are simply liberalized Chicago-regime bilaterals. Each 
(typically) opens up market access to all the airlines registered to operate by the two signatory 
states.  Thus (to take a particularly pathbreaking example) under the US-Netherlands agreement 
of 1992, any certified US airline may fly between any US city and any city in the Netherlands 
(though this effectively means Amsterdam) and any Dutch airline (and this might be one of at 
least four, including KLM) may fly between any city in the Netherlands and any city in the 
United States. 
 
To this extent, an “open skies” agreement is liberalizing. But it is still restricts 
competition on routes between the signatory states to airlines “substantially owned and 
effectively controlled” by nationals of those states. Only airlines that meet this nationality 
requirement as specified by the Netherlands for Dutch airlines and by the US for US airlines may 
take advantage of the Netherlands-US open skies agreement. Air France and Sabena, for 
example, cannot enter the Amsterdam-US market: the scope for greater competition is thus 
limited and, conversely, a significant potential for cartel-like behavior remains.  
 
Secondly, only certain parts of the skies are “open” under “open skies” agreements. The 
nationality restrictions that apply to designation for international services also forbid services by 
foreign carriers within domestic markets.  Lufthansa can fly between Frankfurt and Chicago, but 
it cannot pick up passengers in Chicago and fly them on to, say, Denver - much less operate a 
free-standing domestic service between American cities. Such service would constitute   17 
“cabotage” and is strenuously opposed by labor unions and other interests in the US (as well as 
being illegal under American law).   
 
On the European side, the issue of cabotage has been complicated by the establishment of 
the single market.  Before the market was set up, various foreign airlines (including several 
American carriers) obtained so-called “fifth freedom” rights to carry traffic between national 
capitals as extensions of transatlantic services. In the logic of the single market, such services 
ceased to be “international” flights and became “domestic” flights – and therefore in principle 
open to challenge as “cabotage” services operated by foreign airlines.  In truth, fifth freedom 
services by non-EU carriers carry a very small proportion of intra-EU traffic and their 
significance for competition across the Atlantic has been dwarfed by the recently-created 
transatlantic alliance systems. But European (particularly British) negotiators like to use the 
existence of such “fifths” as a stick with which to beat their American counterparts, claiming that 
they demonstrate inequity: US airlines are (the argument runs) allowed to operate within the EU 
domestic market, but EU airlines are excluded from operating within the American domestic 
market. 
 
A third problem about the open skies approach is that it does not deal with the problem of 
unequal benefits, least of all when the US signs an agreement with a small state. In such cases, it 
may actually provoke criticism on the American side, while inflaming fears in the smaller state. 
On the American side, critics see the “balance of benefits” as tipped excessively toward the 
smaller state. For example, the US-Netherlands agreement provoked outrage in some air 
transport circles in the US because it gave Dutch airlines the run of the huge American market, 
while offering only the very small Dutch market to American carriers in return.  This objection is 
not usually tempered by pointing out that the airlines of smaller countries do not usually have the 
resources (or the domestic demand) to be able to offer services to multiple American cities.
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On the European side, however, open skies agreements have sometimes inspired a fear 
that national carriers would be overwhelmed by the larger American carriers, as well as a 
suspicion that the US Department of Transportation is simply a stalking horse for the large 
American carriers.  While many of the smaller EU Member States do not in fact offer the traffic 
to attract great expansion by US carriers, the domestic flag-carriers (which until very recently 
were still commonly weak, state-owned airlines) have in the past feared a relative decline in 
market share on routes that were crucial to them for earning revenue. 
 
The fourth limitation of the “open skies” approach is that it involves reaching bilaterals 
with Member States of the EU that are exclusive in character and thus at odds with the principles 
of the EC Treaty and with the single aviation market.  This issue is discussed in more detail 
below in considering the potential for an EU-US common aviation area.  
 
ROUTE II: A TRANSATLANTIC COMMON AVIATION AREA 
 
In response to the US campaign to liberalize transatlantic aviation through bilateral “open 
skies” agreements with individual Member States, the European Commission has throughout the 
nineteen-nineties asserted that it should take over the role of negotiator with third countries (such 
as the US) on behalf of the Member States.    18 
 
The EU’s campaign has been justified on legal, logical and tactical grounds. Legally, the 
Commission has argued that its assumption of this role is justified by its authority as negotiator 
of external trade agreements under Article 113 of the EC Treaty.
51 This role was also, in its eyes, 
in the logic of the single market, while, conversely, exclusive bilateral agreements were 
inconsistent with the single market. The Commission did not seek to annul existing bilateral 
agreements and, indeed, did not initially propose to take over all bilateral negotiations from 
Member States (a task for which it clearly lacked sufficient professional staff).
52  It does, 
however, argue that the nationality clauses in bilaterals (including the new generation of  “open 
skies” bilaterals) are inconsistent with the right of EU airlines (like other businesses) to establish 
themselves in any Member State and to fly to third countries.  Consequently, the Commission 
holds that nationality clauses (as required under traditional bilaterals) are “contrary to 
Community law, since they discriminate on the basis of nationality and undermine effectively the 
right of establishment.”
53  The Commission has in fact challenged the legality of the open skies 
agreements signed by many Member States through proceedings against the latter in the 
European Court of Justice.
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Tactically (and perhaps most persuasively to the industry), the Commission has argued 
(and argues) that a better deal for Europe could be obtained by an authority representing 374 
million people than by fifteen authorities representing as few as 394,000.  It also argued, more 
specifically, that such a better “balance of benefits” for both the EU and the US could be 
obtained between a bloc representing 374 million and a country with a population of 260 million. 
Indeed, it envisages that such a parity of markets and benefits could lead to the creation of a 
single transatlantic aviation area  - an aviation free trade zone, which might, with the abolition of 
the existing nationality and cabotage restrictions develop into a single aviation market.
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  After some argument about the legal basis of the Commission’s claim to external 
competence and opposition by some Member States in the Council of Ministers, the latter body 
finally agreed in June 1996 to give the Commission a limited mandate to negotiate with the US 
for a “common aviation area”, largely because of the threat to competition implicit in the 
creation of two new major alliances.
56  However, the mandate excluded traffic rights from the 
first phase of negotiations, authorizing only discussion of  “soft rights”, relating to competition 
rules, state aids, code sharing, reservations systems and ownership rights: “hard rights” (notably 
traffic rights) were to follow in a separate second phase.
57 However, the US government insisted 
that traffic rights be included in a single agenda for talks and announced in October 1996, after 
an unsuccessful meeting with the Commission, that it would continue to pursue open skies 
bilaterals.   
 
In March and again in October 1998, the Council of Ministers  rejected Kinnock’s 
request for a comprehensive negotiating mandate for discussions with the US. The Commission 
then decided to seek support for the Commission’s claim to competence by taking legal action in 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) against eight Member States which since 1995 had signed 
bilateral agreements with the US.
58   Undaunted by the Commission’s action, three other 
Member States (France, Italy and Spain) went ahead and signed new bilaterals with the US, one 
of them (the accord with Italy) being a full open skies agreement. Similarly, as noted above, the 
alliance structure continued to grow, albeit with some changes of partner.   19 
 
Yet with the approach of the new GATT round and the announcement by the US DOT of 
an international meeting (which eventually took place in Chicago in December 1999), interest in 
the idea of an EU-US common aviation area returned.  Eight Member States had declared their 
support for giving the Commission its full negotiating mandate for talks with the US, as had the 
Association of European Airlines (AEA), the president of Air France, and various business 
lobbies.
 59 The AEA’s support was especially heartening for the Commission, although it was 
accompanied by recommendations that Member States be allowed to continue negotiating 
bilaterals until an EU-US agreement was signed and that the actions against Member States in 
the ECJ be stopped.
60 In late November 1999, the new Transport Commissioner, Loyola de 
Palacio, and the director of air transport at DG Transport, Michel Ayral, expressed their 
determination to press energetically for a Transatlantic Common Aviation Area.
61 At the DOT’s 
Chicago meeting, the Transport Commissioner in fact suggested that the EU and the US should 
hold bilateral meetings every six months to prepare for a “framework conference for [air 
transport] relations” by the summer of 2002.
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  Compared to the open skies formula, the notion of  a common aviation area offers 
significant “value added” (a phrase invariably used in EU statements).  It would make it  possible 
to complete the single aviation market within the EU by permitting European airlines to fly from 
any European city to any city in the US, thus transcending the limits imposed by nationality 
requirements in open skies and other bilaterals.  Air France, for example, could thus offer direct 
services from Brussels or Amsterdam to New York or anywhere else in the US, as well as 
connecting services from France through other European cities to North America.   
 
  Both the merits and the limitations of this change have, however, to be gauged by  
considering the present operation of and potential for hub-and-spoke networks set up by the 
various airline alliances.  The latter have created a few magnetic hubs within Europe: Frankfurt 
and (to a lesser extent) Copenhagen for the Star Alliance, Amsterdam and Milan for the Wings 
Alliance, Paris for the Delta-Air France alliance, and London (and perhaps Madrid) for 
Oneworld.  The common aviation area would enable airlines to challenge the domination of 
these hubs by a particular alliance and would, indeed, encourage greater competition between 
alliances.  KLM and Alitalia might (by operating so-called “seventh freedom” flights between 
Germany and the United States) challenge the Star Alliance’s domination of Frankfurt.  But to do 
so economically would require the Wings Alliance to establish its own traffic-feeding hub in 
Frankfurt, to attract passengers from central, northern and southern Europe.  It would have to 
offer lower fares or more convenient scheduling than the Star Alliance in order to overcome the 
latter’s much larger network of connecting services.  
 
If the common aviation area were accompanied by simultaneous removal of cabotage and 
nationality restrictions on both sides of the Atlantic (as the EU proposes), the outcome would 
indeed be a single aviation market stretching from Seattle to Athens (or wherever was the eastern 
most point of an enlarged EU).  In the EU’s formulation, airlines could then fly at liberty 
“between and within the EU and the US.”  Such an outcome would truly vindicate the 
Commission’s claims about its power as a single negotiator for the EU and would truly represent 
the end of the Chicago regime. But, given the strong opposition in the US to yielding restrictions 
on cabotage and nationality, the EU would probably have to settle for a less ambitious deal   20 
which would in effect be an EU-US open skies bilateral, allowing flights by any EU or US 
between any points in the EU and any points in the US (but without rights to operate connecting 
flights within the domestic markets of either entity).  Even such a reform would be a substantial 
blow to the global authority of the Chicago system, and it might also go some way to 
undermining the current alliances, or at least their potential for choking competition.  
 
ROUTE III: THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 
 
  Air transport (as noted earlier) was specifically excluded from the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) which came into force in 1995. This “unique sectoral exclusion” (as a 
WTO document puts it) was also unanimous on the part of all 108 delegations to the Uruguay 
round negotiations.
63  The exclusion is embodied in a specific annex which provides that, while 
the WTO Agreement will apply to maintenance and marketing services related to air transport, it 
will not apply to measures affecting:  
 
(a) traffic rights, however granted; or 
(b) services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights.
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Reinforcing the point that the GATS does not challenge the Chicago regime, the Annex states: 
 
  It is confirmed that any specific commitment made or obligation assumed under this 
Agreement shall not reduce or affect a Member's obligations under bilateral or 
multilateral agreements that are in effect on the date of entry into force of  the WTO 
Agreement.
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While the body of the Annex clearly excludes all forms of air transport traffic rights, an 
opportunity for reconsidering this exclusion will arise in 2000.
 66  The WTO’s Council for Trade 
in Services is required to review, “at least every five years,” further developments in the air 
transport sector and the operation of the active provisions in the Annex “with a view to 
considering the possible further application of the [GATS] agreement in this sector”.  
 
  However, while some advocates of air transport liberalization (including, now, some 
governments) do see inclusion of the entire industry in the GATS as a logical and efficient way 
of putting an end to the Chicago system, the arguments against taking this route will be the same 
in 2000 as in 1990.
67  The main objection concerns application of  two central elements of  the 
GATT system – the Most Favored Nation principle and “national treatment” - to international air 
transport. The Most Favored Nation principle requires that a country offer to all trading partners 
treatment as generous as that offered to any single trading partner. Its application would entail 
opening up the markets of the more liberal states to more protectionist states, without the 
assurance of reciprocity. While this principle provides an important instrument for ratcheting up 
the liberalization of international trade, it creates a serious risk of enabling “free-rider” 
protectionist states to enter large and lucrative markets (such as the US and EU markets) without 
any obligation to offer the same reciprocity as offered between liberal trading partners. Not 
surprisingly, then, countries with quite dissimilar economic philosophies but with large aviation 
markets (such as the US and Japan) have been among the most active opponents of including air 
transport in the GATS.
68 
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  The second principle - that of national treatment – requires that foreign companies 
established in a country be treated in all official actions and in law the same as companies of 
national origin.  Applied to the air transport industry, this principle would clash with current 
rules on nationality and on cabotage: foreign-owned airlines would, once legally established, 
enjoy the right to operate on equal terms with national airlines.  
 
  Politically, some of the strongest opposition to inclusion of air transport in the GATS is 
to be found among labor unions, especially in the US. On 29 September 1999, for example, the 
annual meeting of the Transportation Trades Department of the AFL-CIO adopted a resolution 
expressing “strong opposition to efforts to include air transport services” in the GATS 
negotiations due to begin in Seattle in November 1999.  The conference claimed that this 
“disastrous proposal” would, by application of the MFN principle, open the US market to foreign 
airlines on both domestic and international markets: “The result would place US carriers at a 
severe competitive disadvantage and would in turn be disastrous for US airline workers.”
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Conversely, officials of several governments and international organizations have argued 
for a reconsideration of the status of international aviation under the GATS.
70  The European 
Commission, in its preparatory document for the Seattle meeting, argued that “commitments to 
further liberalisation should be secured” and noted that “negotiations will include … a re-
assessment of the Annex on Air Transport.”
71 Some officials have argued that incorporation of 
air transport in the GATS might be combined with an expanding liberal plurilateral agreement of 
the kind discussed below.
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ROUTE IV: MULTILATERALS AND PLURILATERALS 
  
An alternative to (or possibly an expansion of ) the concept of a common transatlantic 
aviation area discussed under Route III above is the formula for one or more multilateral or 
plurilateral agreements.
73 Here, three or more liberally-minded countries would agree to 
constitute a zone of liberalized services among themselves, abandoning the restrictions 
(including those concerning nationality) of the Chicago system except in relation to non-
members. In principle, the parties to a multilateral or plurilateral agreement would have to decide 
what range of freedoms would be available within the liberalized zone. The relevant freedoms 
(additional to those provided by bilaterals) are freedom to fly between any two member countries 
(say, for American Airlines to fly between Canada and points in the EU) (seventh freedom 
flights) and freedom to fly between points inside other member countries (eighth freedom – more 
familiarly, cabotage flights). Many proposals seem to assume complete freedom of operation 
within the liberalized area.
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The members of such a multilateral “island” would not have to be physically adjacent.  
Indeed, proposals for potential membership of a first multilateral often refer to such 
geographically-distant states as the Netherlands, Singapore, and Canada. While the economic 
impact – and the demonstration effect - might be greater if an aviation multilateral were formed 
by adjacent countries, the nature of aviation itself renders territorial proximity less important. 
 
As Brian F.Havel has argued in his excellent book, In Search of Open Skies, an EU-US 
common aviation area might form the first building block for a liberalized multilateral zone.
75   22 
The hope would be that other countries – seeing the benefits enjoyed by airlines and consumers 
within the liberalized zone – would then join, accepting in the process a kind of aviation acquis 
communautaire. Canada would be a probable early candidate for adhesion, especially since it 
already has an open skies agreement with the US. Enlargement might occur through adhesion by 
individual states or through the combination of two or more liberalized zones (such as that 
recently created in central America). 
 
Two immediate issues face the advocates of such a route to liberalization. The first is that 
of critical mass. Without an EU-US agreement as a basis, it is hard to identify a large enough 
number of potential members (judged by present policies) to give the grouping credibility with 
and appeal sufficient to attract further members.  A group consisting of Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Singapore hardly suggests that an irresistible tide of liberalization has set in. 
The US government has expressed interest in creation of a “multilateral or plurilateral 
arrangements”, though it tends to see such arrangements as growing more through an 
aggregation of some or all of the 36 open skies bilaterals it has now signed.  With the US – and 
even more with both the EU and the US – joining a liberalizing multilateral, the market power 
and possibilities of the liberalized zone would obviously increase enormously.   
 
Politically, it would be much easier to persuade the airline industries in the larger markets 
to accept new membership since reciprocity would be an absolute condition for joining.  The 
“free rider” problem associated with MFN status would not exist and presumably only those 
countries would be attracted to joining which had airlines sufficiently strong to withstand open 
competition in their own markets and to take advantage of the opportunities arising from access 
to a huge external market. Membership would be neither an automatic benefit flowing from 
membership of a general international trading agreement nor an outcome of political pressure by 
a superpower, and the superpower’s airlines, as has sometimes been alleged about existing open 
skies bilaterals. As with the EU, countries would apply to join because of the demonstrated 
benefits already enjoyed by countries of different sizes. Logically, they would only apply when 
the balance of benefits against costs appeared to them to be positive. Thus what was originally a 
multilateral body could evolve into a more open, plurilateral body - an expansive system of 
voluntary and progressive liberalization, and one that, incidentally, would be in tune with the 
network strategies of the airlines, both large and small.  
 
The second issue affecting a multilateral agreement is the same as that facing EU 
governments and airlines regarding third countries outside the zone of liberalization, namely, the 
survival of bilaterals between such countries and the countries which have signed the agreement.   
 
The nationality restrictions in these bilaterals would have at least two serious 
consequences.  Suppose that the multilateral included Canada, the EU and the US.  First, the 
nationality restrictions would prevent the operation of  “seventh freedom services”, such as an 
Air France flight from Los Angeles to Tokyo or an Air Canada flight from Paris to St  
Petersburg.  Japan or Russia could deny such services by arguing that neither airline was of 
appropriate nationality to fly these routes under the provisions of US-Japan or the France-Russia 
bilaterals, respectively.  
   23 
Secondly (as is now the case within the EU), the nationality restrictions in bilaterals with 
third countries would inhibit movement of capital (specifically, purchase of the equity of an 
airline by non-nationals, whether individuals or firms) for fear that “denationalization” might 
lead to the suspension of traffic rights by third countries. (Most multilateral formulas assume that 
nationality restrictions would cease to exist within the liberalized zone – they would, in fact, no 
longer have a rationale)  In the event of a carrier coming under “substantial ownership and 
effective control” by non-nationals, it might be necessary to create a procedure by which that 
carrier (and only that carrier) acquired a "plurilateral" nationality to enable it to continue to 
operate on routes covered by bilaterals with third countries.
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CONCLUSIONS: 
 
Ingenious though the procedure outlined at the end of the previous section is, the very 
need for such ingenuity highlights once again the archaic (and arcane) nature of the regulatory 
regime governing international air transport.  Yet most observers of this sector seem now to 
believe that the scale and dynamics of the industry will lead in the near or medium future to an 
abandonment of the Chicago system.  Discussions at conferences on international regulation of 
air transport commonly reveal a general if informal and complicit understanding between airline 
managers and government officials that substantial change is both overdue and imminent.   
 
However, to obtain a sharper sense of the probable pace and outcome of liberalization, 
observers of the airline industry need, however, to identify and weigh the forces working for and 
against liberalization. The most important pressure working for earlier rather than later 
liberalization is clearly the scale and the dynamics of the sector itself. As noted earlier, air 
transport is the most naturally cosmopolitan of industries – with maritime transport and space 
exploration, the only industry to operate in a borderless environment.  More immediately, the 
economics of the industry are currently driving it towards the creation of larger and more 
comprehensive networks, under the sponsorship of  enterprise alliances that are, as Julius 
Maldutis remarked, “merely substitutes for mergers.”
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As with other sectors in which globalization is occurring, the emergence of  ever-larger 
business entities in air transport  faces barriers erected as much out of  fear as out of  crude 
protectionism.  Airlines and governments in smaller and in developing countries naturally fear 
being overwhelmed or marginalized, whether by the current alliances or by the megacarriers that 
may succeed them.  Organized labor fears, as elsewhere, the loss of jobs and reductions in 
salaries and professional opportunities that, they suspect will follow the collapse of nationality 
and cabotage rules.  Policy-makers and others concerned with national security in some countries 
(including the US) are still nervous about the implications of allowing foreign nationals to obtain 
greater control of  aircraft that might be needed in an emergency to transport troops and 
equipment.
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The most vocal skeptics at present are consumer advocates (inside and outside  
government) who see a serious threat to competition from an industry that wants both 
liberalization and  economic security. It is clearly true that, depending on the regulatory controls 
applied to them, international mergers might well present an even-greater threat to competition 
than the current alliances. Officials in the European Commission and their counterparts in the US   24 
Departments of Justice and Transport are now thoroughly alert to the many aspects of airline 
operation in which threats to competition might arise (the Department of Justice itself having, 
ironically, made the consolidation of alliances possibility by provision of anti-trust immunity!)  
Agreements between the EU and the US already exist for coordination of competition policy and 
one writer has even suggested creation of  both an Open Skies Commission and an International 
Court of Air Transport to prevent anti-competitive behavior under a liberalized plurilateral 
regime.
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By whatever route (or, quite possibly, combination of routes) the air transport  industry 
moves toward greater liberalization, the impact of  such liberalization will depend on the 
continuing interaction between airlines (and their strategies) and public bodies (and the 
regulatory frameworks they impose). Conditioning both are the basic economics of the industry: 
we may close this chapter by speculating on how such economics might shape transatlantic air 
transport in a completely liberalized environment.  
 
Liberalization would certainly create opportunities for national start-up airlines and 
foreign airlines to operate on routes now restricted to designated national carriers.  The history of 
this industry – especially on its transatlantic services – suggests that intensified competition 
would lead to more crises of overcapacity, more fare wars, and surely more bankruptcies. But 
such wars tend to be brief (if destructive of profits) and to be followed by a new equilibrium in 
which (as a quick glance at some airline Websites will confirm) more or less open “fare 
coordination” returns - even under the present partially liberalized regime. 
 
Recent experience of open skies does suggest that liberalization would cause a dramatic 
expansion of demand, along with significantly reduced fares on existing routes (and especially 
on currently-protected routes, such as those to and from London).  But while cities such as 
Pittsburgh would be freer than now to seek replacement carriers for international services when 
abandoned by incumbent airlines, the record of low-fare carriers such as Laker and Virgin 
Atlantic is one of trying to bite off a chunk of the traffic flowing into major cities which are not 
hubs dominated by a domestic carrier, rather than one of exploring underserved and sometimes 
untested international markets. Such caution may, however, reflect the very demanding and 
exiguous conditions for new entrants under the present Chicago regime. 
  
  Complete liberalization of transatlantic air transport may be a long-term prospect, 
especially if liberalization is defined as requiring the abolition of cabotage restrictions. 
Moreover, even if alliances collapse into mergers, the airline industry and governments will still 
be faced with fundamental issues of contestability and competition and with the peculiar 
economics of an industry that walks an interminable, fine line between tenuous profits and 
unpredictable loss.  
 
While it is hard to discount the strength of the tide that now seems to be running toward 
further liberalization of air transport, the route by which it will come is as unclear as its timing.  
Of the three routes toward liberalization discussed here, it seems that the most likely (or least 
unlikely) route is through an EU-US transatlantic common aviation area. Admittedly, the 
European Commission is much more actively pressing this idea at present than its US 
counterpart in the DOT.  In a recent interview, Rodney Slater, the US Secretary of   25 
Transportation, acknowledged that his Department’s priority is to complete its campaign for 
bilateral open skies agreements. He agreed that (in his own words),”If the EU was granted 
authority to negotiate on behalf of all Europe, we would welcome that. But until that becomes a 
reality, then we will negotiate with individual countries.”
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Indeed, no doubt to the dismay of the EU delegates and over the Commission’s 
objections, the DOT used the occasion of the Chicago conference to stage a formal signing of its 
open skies agreement with Italy. Slater stated on this occasion that, while the Chicago conference 
would discuss “what are being called plurilateral arrangements”, he felt that “this was an 
objective for the next century rather than a short-term likelihood.”
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Yet, if liberalization is to come at all, it will probably have to be through a direct deal 
between Europe and the US, rather than through a general liberalization achieved in WTO 
negotiations.  Reportedly, the US has in fact decided not to press for inclusion of air services in 
the GATS, judging (as indeed Slater suggested) that there is still insufficient  support for global 
liberalization in this sector. The demonstrations in Seattle at the time of the WTO ministerial 
must surely have confirmed in Washington minds the wisdom of such caution.  It is true that, 
despite the multitude of causes evident on this occasion, no journalist actually reported seeing 
placards demanding protection of the Chicago Convention of 1944.  But it would be a brave (or 
rash) transportation official who would speak out at present for free trade in a sector as 
emblematic of globalization as international air transport.    26 
APPENDIX  1:
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IF PAINT SHOPS WERE LIKE AIRLINES 
 
 
  A man walks into a hardware shop that, unknown to him, is owned and operated by a 
major airline. The following exchange ensues: 
 
Customer:  Hi, how much is your paint? 
Sales agent:  Well, there is a really big price range. The lowest price is $9 a gallon, and         we  
have 150 different prices up to $200 a gallon. 
Customer:  What is the difference in the paint? 
Sales agent:  Oh, there is no difference - it’s all the same paint. 
Customer:  Well, then, I want the $9 paint. 
Sales agent:  When do you intend to use it? 
Customer:  I want to paint tomorrow, on my day off. 
Sales agent:  Sir, tomorrow the paint is $200. 
Customer:  What? When would I have to paint in order to buy the $9 version? 
Sales agent:  That will be in three weeks, but you will also have to agree to start painting before  
Friday of that week and continue painting until at least Sunday. And I must check 
to see if we have any of that paint available. 
Customer:  What do you mean, “check to see if it is available”? You have shelves full of that  
stuff  - I can see it right there. 
 Sales agent:  Just because you can see it does not mean that we have it. It may be the same  
paint, but we can only sell a certain number of gallons of $9 paint for any given 
weekend. 
Customer:  This is crazy! And what happens if I decide not to use the paint? 
Sales agent:  The $9 paint is non-refundable - but you are in luck! The price just went up to  
$12. Now that paint can be returned for a $75 service charge. 
                           
Customer:  You mean the price went up while we were talking? 
Sales agent:  Yes, sir. You see, we change prices thousands of times a day and, as you have not  
actually walked out of the store with your paint yet, the price just changed. 
Customer:  Well, that does it - I’m going somewhere else to buy my paint. 
Sales agent:  As you wish, sir. But remember: we all do business the same way.” 
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Germany and other countries in to Amsterdam before reboarding them on to transatlantic aircraft (and 
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